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OPPORTUNISTIC DISCIPLINE: USING EURASIAN
INTEGRATION TO IMPROVE SANCTIONS
AGAINST BELARUS
Ilya Zlatkin
PART I: INTRODUCTION
“The last true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.”1 Since for-
mer United States Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice coined this
phrase in 2005, this less than flattering title has clung to Belarus.2 For
its part, however, the former Soviet republic’s government has done
enough to maintain the moniker. Under President Alexander
Lukashenko’s rule, the authorities have quashed nonviolent demon-
strations, imprisoned political adversaries, and dominated media out-
lets.3 After thousands of Belarusians protested Lukashenko’s
reelection in December 2010, the Belarusian president further
clamped down on the public’s right to assemble.4 In addition, seven
opposing candidates found themselves behind bars.5
Despite the West’s assertion that President Lukashenko vio-
lated human rights, Lukashenko refused to change his approach,
prompting a new wave of economic and political sanctions.6 Regardless
of legal arguments against sanctions, such measures often fail to pro-
duce desired results.7 Worse, they frequently hamper the invoking
party’s aims,8 and this case is no different. Still, the United States and
the European Union (“EU”) can improve the currently detrimental
framework. A positive outcome requires the reassessment not only of
1 ANDREW WILSON, BELARUS: THE LAST DICTATORSHIP IN EUROPE, at x, xi (2011).
2 Id.
3 Michael Mostyn, Democratic Wave Bypasses Belarus, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec.
28, 2011, http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/1108141—demo
cratic-wave-bypasses-belarus.
4 Id.
5 Michael Schwirtz, Belarus Signals It Could Seize Opponent’s Son, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/world/europe/10belarus.html?
pagewanted=all.
6 See House Passes Bill Tightening Belarus Sanctions, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20,
2011, 9:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20111220/us-belarus/.
7 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Estab-
lishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L
L. 413, 449 (2001).
8 Id. at 446-47.
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Belarus’s role in the international arena, but also of its internal ideo-
logical developments.
In August 2011, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control
(“OFAC”) froze the properties of four Belarusian enterprises, prohib-
ited American citizens from transacting with these state-owned busi-
nesses, and added more individuals to the Specially Designated
Nationals (“SDN”) List.9 A few months later, President Barack Obama
signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011.10 Even
though Congress labeled the bill as a sanction, the legislation simply
itemizes America’s displeasure with the Lukashenko regime.11 The
Act does not impose any new penalties on the country, though it does
attempt to pressure the International Hockey Federation (“IHF”) into
relocating a tournament the IHF previously granted to Belarus.12
Facially, the sanctions imposed by the OFAC and the Belarus
Democracy and Human Rights Act seem to cost the United States lit-
tle. While the United States might not achieve its goal of crippling the
Lukashenko regime, it can appear proactive in the fight against op-
pression.13 Belarus’s nonexistent economic influence decreases its
sanction costs.14 If in fact the United States stands to lose nothing,
then it would be remiss to not pass an anti-Lukashenko declaration,
regardless of the normative arguments against such action. The real
costs of sanctioning Belarus, however, are not limited to bilateral
trade with the former Soviet republic. Belarus’s perpetual alliance
9 Treasury Sanctions Four Entities of State-Owned Belarusian Petrochemicals
Conglomerate, U.S. TREAS. DEPT. (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/belarus_notice_081120
11.pdf. See generally Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. TREAS.
DEPT., http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.
aspx (last updated Mar. 7, 2012).
10 Barack Obama Signs into Law Belarus Sanctions Bill, RIA NOVOSTI (Jan 4,
2012, 7:59 AM), http://en.ria.ru/world/20120104/170614305.html.
11 See Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-82, 125
Stat. 1863 [hereinafter Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act].
12 Id. § 3(10). Since the bill’s passing, the IHF has already stated that it does not
intend to get involved in political struggles. It will host the 2014 World Champion-
ships in Minsk. E.g., Ice Hockey Championship to be Held in Europe’s Last Dicta-
torship?, CHARTER ‘97 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://charter97.org/en/news/2012/1/9/46557/.
13 See, e.g., Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act § 3(1) (“It is the policy of
the United States to . . . condemn the conduct of the December 19, 2010, presiden-
tial election and crackdown on opposition candidates, political leaders, and activ-
ists, civil society representatives, and journalists . . .”).
14 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD
– USA (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
september/tradoc_113465.pdf.
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with Russia15 and its strategic importance to China’s entrance into
European markets16 make the small nation increasingly vital to Amer-
ican interests.
The preferred methods of sanctioning Belarus do not materi-
ally impact the nation’s government.17 Instead, they deteriorate the
prospects of regular citizens – allegedly the intended beneficiaries of
these measures.18 Better solutions exist. While the advent of the Sin-
gle Economic Space (“SES”) and the Eurasian Economic Union
(“EEU”) will render some sanctions inept, these new institutions could
provide an avenue for improving the American position.19
In addition, the United States should reevaluate Belarus’s eco-
nomic and political landscape. If the United States government wishes
to improve the lives of ordinary Belarusians, it should consider alter-
ing aspects of travel regulations.20 Free visas for ordinary citizens
would help open up the country.21 Likewise, the United States and the
15 See Fyodor Ptitsyn, Russia Saves Strongman Lukashenko from Complete
Isolation, PRAVDA (Nov. 14, 2011), http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/14-
11-2011/119610-russia_belarus-0/; Vladimir Putin Supports the Merger of Russia
and Belarus, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/russia/8675759/Vladimir-Putin-supports-merger-of-Russia-and
-Belarus.html.
16 All-round Ties with China Priority for Belarus, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-12/22/content_14309094.htm.
17 Cf. Yaraslau Kryvoi, The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade: Why Euro-
pean Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 209, 243–44 (2008).
18 See Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act § 3(2)–(5).
19 The SES, which began operating in 2012, is a common market. This removes all
barriers to movement of factors of production among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakh-
stan. In November 2011, these three nations also signed a set of documents, set-
ting the framework for a transition to the EEU – a complete economic union
scheduled to begin operating in 2015. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan plan to join as
well. See INTEGRATION COMM. SECRETARIAT OF THE EURASIAN ECON. CMTY.,
EURASEC TODAY 35 (2011). [hereinafter EURASEC TODAY], available at http://
www.evrazes.com/i/other/EurAsEC-today_eng.pdf; Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan
Agree on Economic Union, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 18, 2011,
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_belarus_kazakhstan_plan_economic_union/24
395264.html.
20 See Andrei Liakhovich, Getting the Travel Ban Right, BELARUS DIGEST (Nov. 27,
2011), http://belarusdigest.com/story/getting-travel-ban-right-6713 [hereinafter
Getting the Travel Ban Right]; Shushkevich: Best Sanctions – Free Visas,
TELEGRAF.BY (Jan. 5, 2012), http://telegraf.by/en/2012/01/shushkevich-luchshie-
sankcii-besplatnie-vizi [hereinafter Shushkevich].
21 Shushkevich, supra note 20.
31478_rgl_11-3 Sheet No. 32 Side B      06/15/2012   17:09:41
31478_rgl_11-3 Sheet No. 32 Side B      06/15/2012   17:09:41
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\11-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-JUN-12 16:04
294 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:3
EU should reconsider their approach to travel bans.22 Rather than
continuing to blacklist members of the Belarusian bureaucracy, the
West should closely examine the behaviors of individual politicians.
Realistically, only time will lead to change, but proper management of
sanctions may achieve that goal quicker.
Though this comment focuses on the effects of America’s sanc-
tions, it inherently implicates the EU. While Belarus does not play a
major role in the American economy, it does significantly impact the
EU’s economy.23  Ineffective sanctions, regardless of who imposes
them, harm both the innocent citizens of the sanctioned country and
the citizens of states who interact with the sanctioned country.24 Con-
sequently, any successful solution likely depends on EU participation.
Western governments cannot directly accomplish every solution pro-
posed here. Some changes, only the private sector can drive, but gov-
ernments need to provide the proper incentives to elicit the desired
responses.
This comment does not condemn or condone the Lukashenko
regime’s policies. Instead, it evaluates the effectiveness of the U.S.
sanctions and provides some feasible alternatives. Also, this comment
avoids normative arguments against sanctions, concentrating more on
the probable economic and political effects.25 Part II supplies back-
ground information on the political developments within Belarus since
the Soviet Union’s collapse, including prior sanctions that the West
22 Getting the Travel Ban Right, supra note 20. See S.B., Nomenclature and the
Hope for Democracy in Belarus, BELARUS DIGEST (Dec. 8, 2011), http://belarusdi-
gest.com/story/nomenclature-and-hope-democracy-belarus-6886.
23 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD
– BELARUS (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
september/tradoc_113351.pdf [hereinafter EC STATISTICS - BELARUS].
24 See Cann, supra note 7, at 427.
25 One of the most powerful arguments against sanctions is their selective en-
forcement, which creates a double standard. Id. at 450–52. In short, the United
States chooses to punish an authoritarian regime in Belarus while choosing to
ignore human rights violations in Uzbekistan and political imprisonment in
Ukraine. The United States has imposed farcical, half-hearted sanctions in Vene-
zuela. See generally, Muzaffar Suleymanov, What United States Can’t Accept in
Belarus, It Supports in Uzbekistan, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS BLOG
(Jan. 11, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.cpj.org/blog/2012/01/what-us-cant-accept-in-
belarus-it-supports-in-uzbe.php; Yulia Tymoshenko’s Trials, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
15, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21532290; Michael Economides, Silly
Sanctions Against Venezuela Boost Hugo Chavez, FORBES, June 13, 2011, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/06/13/silly-sanctions-against-venezu
ela-boost-hugo-chavez/. Interestingly, Venezuela is not even listed on the United
States Treasury’s website as a sanctioned country. See Sanctions Programs and
Country Information, U.S. TREAS. DEPT., http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx (last updated Jan. 12, 2012).
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imposed. Part III explains why the United States can legally institute
sanctions. Parts IV and V discuss how American sanctions facilitate
appropriation of significant Belarusian state assets by Russia and
China, respectively. Part VI posits that the United States can use Eur-
asian integration to benefit its own economic interests, which include
helping ordinary Belarusian citizens. Part VII examines the practice of
using travel bans to sanction Belarusian officials and suggests a
change to the visa regime as a way to further Western goals. Part VIII
concludes this comment.
PART II: BACKGROUND
Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 1994, less than three
years after the Soviet Union collapsed.26 He succeeded in minimizing
opposition to his rule during the transitional turbulence of the follow-
ing decade.27 The U.S. Congress passed the Belarus Democracy Act of
2004 in response to waves of repression and reports of Belarus’s weap-
ons trade with Iran.28  Aside from listing grievances, the Act intended
to promote democracy in Belarus, even permitting fund allocation to
support the opposition.29 The Act was only supposed to last two
years,30 but without any improvement in the country’s situation, Pres-
ident George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13405 reaffirming con-
demnation of the Belarusian government.31 Executive Order 13405
authorized asset freezes and prohibited American citizens from help-
ing circumvent these financial sanctions.32 Later in the year, Congress
passed the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006, renewing
the 2004 version.33
The outlook brightened in 2008 when the Belarusian govern-
ment released political prisoners and improved its human rights poli-
cies.34 In response, both the United States and the EU removed
sanctions.35 With the onset of the financial crisis, the Belarusian lead-
ership had to rely on the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) for eco-
26 WILSON, supra note 1, at xi.
27 See id. at 194-208.
28 STEVEN WOEHREL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32534, BELARUS: BACKGROUND
AND UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNS 2 (2010).
29 Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 108-347, 118 Stat. 1383
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 5811 (2012)).
30 See id. § 3(d)(1).
31 Exec. Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 20, 2006).
32 Id. §§ 1-2.
33 Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-480, 120 Stat.
3666 (2012) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 5801 (2012)).
34 WOEHREL, supra note 28, at 2.
35 Id.  Though it was proposed, attempts to pass the Belarus Democracy
Reauthorization Act of 2008 stalled. H.R. 5970: Belarus Democracy Reauthoriza-
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nomic relief.36 The IMF conditioned the loans on a liberalization of
economic norms, most notably a twenty-percent devaluation in the Be-
larusian ruble.37 The EU even invited Belarus to participate in the
Eastern Partnership Initiative, an attempt to develop former Soviet
republics that have not yet joined the EU.38 Unfortunately, this
de´tente did not last.
On December 19, 2010, Lukashenko won a fourth term in what
was deemed a rigged election.39  Tens of thousands of Belarusians
poured out into the streets to protest, and the government reacted
with a vicious crackdown, detaining hundreds.40 In the aftermath,
Lukashenko imprisoned the majority of his opponents, most of whom
still remain incarcerated.41 While the West renewed its criticism of the
Belarusian president, the economic crisis began to wreak havoc.42 A
sharp increase in natural gas prices exacerbated the country’s woes, as
the Belarusian ruble inflated by over 100 percent in less than a year.43
With the nation on the verge of ruin, Belarusians initiated a protest
via social media to mimic the Arab Spring.44 Unlike the Arab Spring,
however, this did not yield regime change. In August 2011, the OFAC
issued new sanctions against four state-owned conglomerates – a fer-
tion Act of 2008, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=H110-
5970 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
36 WOEHREL, supra note 28, at 3.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 7.
39 A.O., Belarus’s Election: Lukashenka Uncovered, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20,
2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/12/belaruss_
election.
40 Id.
41 Schwirtz, supra note 5.
42 Yauheni Preiherman, 2011: Year Under the Sign of Crackdown, BELARUS DI-
GEST (Dec. 29, 2011), http://belarusdigest.com/story/2011-year-under-sign-crack
down-7133. In April 2011, the busiest Minsk subway station was bombed. Ram-
pant inflation followed. Though the two problems are almost certainly unrelated,
they converged and exacerbated the atmosphere of fear within the country. See
generally Y.K., The Consequences of the April 11 Minsk Bombing, BELARUS DIGEST
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://belarusdigest.com/2011/04/11/the-consequences-of-the-april-
11-minsk-bombing.
43 Belarus’ Base Inflation in 11 Months of 2011 Reported at 113.6 Percent,
NAVINY.BY (Dec. 9, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://naviny.by/rubrics/english/2011/12/09/ic_
news_259_382426/.
44 Ellen Barry, Sound of Post-Soviet Protest: Claps and Beeps, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/world/europe/15belarus.html?page
wanted=all.
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tilizer manufacturer, a tire factory, a fiber producer, and a major oil
refinery.45
The combination of popular unrest and Western pressure most
likely caused Lukashenko to search for new ways of entrenching him-
self. In October, Russia’s Prime Minister (and most likely future Presi-
dent) Vladimir Putin pitched his idea of a “Eurasian Union,” an
economic union of former Soviet republics.46 With Lukashenko’s urg-
ing, the parties streamlined the process, and the presidents of Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan met a month later to create the framework
for Eurasian reintegration.47  At the end of December, Congress
passed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011, which
President Obama signed on January 3, 2012, placing various visa and
financial restrictions upon many Belarusian officials.48
PART III: AMERICA’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING
SANCTIONS
National law permits the United States to pass the Belarus De-
mocracy and Human Rights Act. In issuing an executive order freezing
Belarusian assets, President George W. Bush labeled the situation in
Belarus an “unusual and extraordinary threat to . . . national security
and foreign policy,”49 and invoked the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act50 and the National Emergencies Act.51  Additional
justification for sanctions is found both in the Foreign Commerce
Clause, which allows the United States to shape its international eco-
nomic policies,52 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, which expressly permits economic sanctions.53
45 New Sanctions Against Belarus, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 11, 2011), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/170405.htm.
46 Dmitry Polikanov, Soviet Reunion?, RT (Oct. 20, 2011, 2:48 PM), http://rt.com/
politics/columns/man-nature-political-animal/soviet-cis-russia-economy/; Robert
Bridge, One Eurasian Union, Please. And Hold the Imperialism!, RT (Oct. 19,
2011, 6:08 PM), http://rt.com/politics/union-putin-integration-soviet-207/.
47 See Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Community, World Bank, http://wits.
worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/EAEC.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see also
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Agree on Economic Union, supra note 19.
48 Barack Obama Signs into Law Belarus Sanctions Bill, supra note 10.
49 Exec. Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 20, 2006).
50 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006).
51 See 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006).
52  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 703 cmt. f
(1987) (“A state may criticize another state for failure to abide by recognized inter-
national human rights standards, and may shape its trade, aid or other national
policies so as to dissociate itself from the violating state or to influence that state
to discontinue the violations.”).
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In denouncing these new sanctions, however, the Belarusian
government claims that the United States has breached the security
assurances it made in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.54 The
United States (along with the United Kingdom and Russia) promised
former Soviet republics that it would “refrain from economic coercion
designed to subordinate to [its] own interest.”55 In exchange, Belarus,
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to surrender the nuclear weapons
stored within their territory.56 Belarus also claims that the United
States has violated exactly the same obligations under the Helsinki
Final Act, which the United States had concluded with the USSR.57
Additionally, the United Nations General Assembly has passed sev-
eral resolutions to denounce unilateral sanctions.58 In a practical
sense, however, none of these international rules are likely to matter.
Though the United States may simply choose to ignore its interna-
tional law obligations as it has often done in the past, it will likely
point to Lukashenko’s illegal acts to justify its own violations. In doing
so, the United States likely will claim that the Belarusian President’s
actions pose an international security threat.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) creates
a framework for unimpeded trade, but it does provide an out for na-
tional security reasons.59 Article XXI, also called the “security excep-
tion,” states that “[n]othing in [the GATT] shall be construed . . . to
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it consid-
ers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . .
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”60
Unfortunately, the GATT fails to clarify what exactly constitutes an
emergency or a national security threat.61 This lack of guidance allows
54 Lukashenka’s Dictatorship Started Nuclear Blackmailing of U.S., Charter ’97
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://charter97.org/en/news/2011/8/19/41757/.
55 Security Assurances: Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with
the Republic of Belarus’ Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons K-7 (Dec. 5, 1994), available at http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb2/Bb2
secK.pdf.
56 Id.
57 Press Release, Republic of Belarus, MFA Press Secretary Andrei Savinykh Re-
plies When Asked by the Media on the Countermeasures in Response to United
States Sanctions (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.belarus.by/en/press-
center/press-release/mfa-press-secretary-andrei-savinykh-replies-when-asked-by-
the-media-on-the-countermeasures-in-response-to-us-sanctions_i_0000002559.
html.
58 G.A. Res. 62/162, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/162 (Mar. 13, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/
183, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/183 (Jan. 31, 2008).
59 Cann, supra note 7, at 414.
60 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
61 Cann, supra note 7, at 415–16.
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each nation to claim the right to define its national security interests
as it sees fit.62 States could interpret the section to include any threat
to fundamental ideology, foreign policy, political stability, or domestic
industry.63 Under its current language, it seems impossible for a
country to violate Article XXI.64
Attempts to justify this mentality have revolved around the
distinction in wording between Article XXI and Article XX, which lists
other exceptions to GATT rules.65 While the security exception allows
a nation to take measures “it considers necessary,” Article XX allows
nations to take “necessary” steps to invoke the other exceptions.66
States wishing to use the exception have articulated that the wording
in Article XXI gives them more leeway in determining what works bet-
ter.67  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) partially agreed with
this assessment, but did not give states carte blanche to use Article
XXI.68 In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ denied individual coun-
tries the ability to determine the meanings of “self-defense” and “ne-
cessity.”69 The ICJ nonetheless upheld the use of unilateral economic
sanctions in Nicaragua, basing its decision on the principle that a
state has the right to choose its trade partners.70
Though the GATT security exception may develop limits, coun-
tries like the United States continue to impose sanctions at will.71 For
example, Congress did not  consider national security interests when
passing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.72 In many ways, it has
become “politically expedient to allow [A]rticle XXI to remain an un-
spoken authority.”73 If a sanctioned country protests such methods,
then the appeal to international regulatory bodies takes a long time
62 Id.
63 Id. at 425.
64 Id. at 415–16.
65 Id. at 422.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 422–23.
69 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 448-49 (2008). It is worth noting that the ICJ does
not have a formal obligation to follow its former rulings but it still frequently relies
on its prior decisions in its reasoning. The ICJ typically explicitly distinguishes
precedent from its current case when it chooses to deviate from this informal stare
decisis. See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
255–56 (5th ed. 2009).
70 Claire M. Diallo, Note, The United States Empire: Is Any Sovereign Nation Safe
After the Russian and Belarus Democracy Acts?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 673, 706–07
(2006).
71 Cann, supra note 7, at 425.
72 Diallo, supra note 70, at 690.
73 Cann, supra note 7, at 425.
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with no guarantees of success. For this reason, a sanctioned country
such as Belarus has no real recourse other than retaliation. Of course,
it has virtually no leverage, so sanctions will remain “legal” in practice
until the imposing nation decides to lift them. In fact, as discussed
below, current conditions have rendered U.S. sanctions against Be-
larus not only moot, but also detrimental to American interests.
PART IV: RUSSIA’S EVER-PRESENT INFLUENCE
Belarus’s close ties to Russia are not a secret. Lukashenko dis-
sented when the Belarusian legislature voted to secede from the
USSR74 and has since consistently supported reintegration.75 The two
nations have a close relationship despite their periodic disagree-
ments.76 As the SES develops and progresses toward the EEU, Be-
larus’s dependence on its big brother will continue to grow. Russia’s
considerable influence makes the majority of sanctions ineffective by
creating low-cost trade outlets for sanctioned Belarusian enterprises.77
More pertinently, Belarus’s precarious economic position permits Rus-
sia to vulture ownership of Belarusian state-owned ventures.78 Reinte-
gration with other former Soviet republics does bring considerable
74 See Andrei Liakhovich, Belarus-Russia: Optimistic Rhetoric and Unsolvable
Contradictions, BELARUS DIGEST (Nov. 16, 2011), http://belarusdigest.com/story/
belarus-russia-optimistic-rhetoric-and-unsolvable-contradictions-6482.
75 Id.
76 See Ptitsyn, supra note 15; Vladimir Putin Supports the Merger of Russia and
Belarus, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/europe/russia/8675759/Vladimir-Putin-supports-merger-of-Russia-and-Bela
rus.html.
77 It is worth giving brief (and non-comprehensive) definitions of the different
levels of integration. A free trade agreement eliminates import tariffs and quotas
between the signatories. A customs union builds on a free trade area by, in addi-
tion to removing internal barriers to the trade of goods, also creating a unified
external trade policy. A common market improves on a customs union by removing
all obstacles to the mobility of people, capital and other resources, as well as elimi-
nating non-tariff barriers to trade, within the area. An economic union further
harmonizes economic institutions and policies. See generally Different Forms of
Integration, U.N. UNIV. OCW, http://ocw.unu.edu/programme-for-comparative-
regional-integration-studies/introducing-regional-integration/different-forms-of-
integration/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (explaining the various ways that social
systems integrate with one another). The Single Economic Space, which started
operating on January 1, 2012, is a common market. See EurAsEC, EURASIAN
ECON. CTR., www.eurasian-ec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=2&Itemid=7 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
78 See Andrei Liakhovich, The Russian Expansion: Tricolor, Mercedes and a
Three-fold Increase in Salary, BELARUS DIGEST (Dec. 26, 2011), http://belarusdi-
gest.com/story/russian-expansion-tricolor-mercedes-and-three-fold-increase-sal-
ary-7102 [hereinafter The Russian Expansion].
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benefits to regular Belarusian citizens, but it also creates new
problems.79 In contrast to the people, the Lukashenko regime only
stands to profit.
To some extent, sanctions against Belarusian state-owned com-
panies do succeed in hurting those ventures. The aftermath, however,
makes those measures counterproductive to Western interests.  The
Belarusian president has shown that he will repay Russia for its sup-
port with shares of Belarusian industries so long as he remains in
power of Belarus.80 The economic crisis has forced Belarus to rely on
loans from other countries to stay afloat. Meanwhile, the nation’s for-
eign debt sits at over a third of its projected GDP.81 Russia owns the
majority of this figure, providing it with incredible leverage over Be-
larus.82 Without any significant natural resources, Belarus cannot
quickly increase its real wealth.83 Its population is too poor to finance
the massive debt.84 Consequently, it will have no choice but to capital-
ize state assets once the loans become due.85
Russia has already begun this type of acquisition.86 Gazprom,
the state-owned Russian natural gas conglomerate, previously had ob-
tained a 50 percent ownership in Beltransgaz, the Belarusian natural
gas transportation company, in 2006.87 Russia and Belarus agreed to
transfer the remaining stake in Beltransgaz to Gazprom within a
79 See George Plaschinsky, Is the Customs Union Good for Belarus?, BELARUS DI-
GEST (Nov. 11, 2011), http://belarusdigest.com/story/customs-union-good-belarus-
6491.
80 See, e.g., Andrei Liakhovich, The Reasons Behind Putin’s Unprecedented Gener-
osity Towards Lukashenka, BELARUS DIGEST (Jan. 5, 2011), http://belarusdigest.
com/story/reasons-behind-putin%E2%80%99s-unprecedented-generosity-towards-
lukashenka-7103 [hereinafter Putin’s Unprecedented Generosity].
81 Yauheni Preiherman, Belarus the Indebted, BELARUS DIGEST (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-indebted-6882.
82 Id.
83 See Iacob Koch-Weser, “Lenders of Last Resort”: Sino-Russian Rivalry in Be-
larus?, BELARUS DIGEST (Nov. 30, 2011) http://belarusdigest.com/story/%E2%80%
9Clenders-last-resort%E2%80%9D-sino-russian-rivalry-belarus-6767 [hereinafter
Lenders of Last Resort].
84 See Average Monthly Income in Belarus – 145$, BELSAT TV (Nov. 17,
2011), http://belsat.eu/en/wiadomosci/a,5836,average-monthly-income-in-belarus-
145.html (showing that Belarusians’ average monthly income was only $145 at the
end of 2011).
85 Preiherman, supra note 81.
86 See The Russian Expansion, supra note 78.
87 Gazprom to Acquire Balance of Beltransgaz, NATURAL GAS EUROPE (June 18,
2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/gazprom-expect-acquire-bal
ance-beltransgaz.
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week of agreeing to the EEU framework.88 While debt repayment did
not directly motivate this deal, Belarus had no other realistic option.89
Minsk had to find a way to minimize future gas prices before the previ-
ous gas deal expired.90 It made the correct decision under the circum-
stances, because the creation of alternative transport routes would
have eaten into Beltransgaz’s profits.91 As Lukashenko was quick to
point out, the pipeline would lose all value without any gas flowing
through it – a factor completely in Russia’s control.92 The recent open-
ing of the Nord Stream would have given Russia the opportunity to
bypass Belarus completely.93 The Nord Stream passes through the
Baltic Sea directly to Germany, circumventing not only Belarus but
also Poland.94 Moreover, Russia plans to construct a southern pipeline
under the Black Sea, avoiding Belarus and Ukraine.95 Even though
Gazprom  stated it would not decrease gas transport through Be-
larus,96 Lukashenko would have left much to chance. Now, with full
control of Beltransgaz, Russia has nothing to lose from continuing to
pump gas through Belarus.97 As a result, Ukrainian and Slovakian
pipelines will absorb the brunt of the cut in volume.98
In return for the remaining shares of the transit company, Be-
larusians received the lower gas prices they coveted.99 Gas-price hikes
were the primary cause of the Belarusian economy’s collapse earlier in
the year.100 As part of the deal, Belarusians received a forty percent
“integration discount,”101 as well as $2.5 billion as compensation for
the remaining shares.102 In addition, the Beltransgaz deal includes a
88 Vladimir Soldatkin & Denis Pinchuk, UPDATE 2 – Russia Woos Belarus with
Gas Price Cut, $10 Billion Loan, UK REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/25/russia-belarus-idUKL5E7MP1JW20111125.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See id.
92 Lukashenka Describes Gas Agreements with Russia as Very Advantageous,
NAVINY.BY (Dec. 3, 2011), http://naviny.by/rubrics/english/2011/12/03/ic_articles_
259_176044/.
93 Soldatkin & Pinchuk, supra note 88.
94  The Pipeline, NORD STREAM AG, http://www.nordstream.com (last visited Feb.
15, 2012).
95 Soldatkin & Pinchuk, supra note 88.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.; Plaschinsky, supra note 79.
100 Soldatkin & Pinchuk, supra note 88.
101 Id.
102 Scott Rose, Russian-led Fund to Disburse Belarus $440 Million Next Month,
BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-28/
russian-led-fund-to-disburse-belarus-440-million-next-month.html.
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loan of $10 billion to build Belarus’s first nuclear power station.103 In
the long term, this will allow Belarus to alleviate its power supply
problems to an extent.104 Preparations have already begun in western
Belarus.105
The Beltransgaz deal had plenty of positive results for ordinary
Belarusian citizens. The country’s coffers received an immediate infu-
sion, and the drastic decrease in gas prices will likely help remedy
short-term economic woes.106 The steady source of power from the nu-
clear reactor will likewise help. Unfortunately, the pipeline sale also
set a conspicuous precedent of Russian appropriation of significant Be-
larusian state assets. Already, the Belarusian government intends to
sell the Minsk Automobile Plant (“MAZ”) to its Russian counterpart
KamAZ.107 The sole remaining obstacle concerns the company’s
worth.108 Auditors valued MAZ at only $800 million, an amount the
Belarusian authorities find inadequate.109 They wish to obtain a sec-
ond opinion, but, pending the appraisal, it looks like MAZ will belong
to Russia soon.110
Moscow likely will continue the pattern of acquiring Belaru-
sian industries.111 It has already sent a clear signal to its neighbor’s
enterprises that they should want to belong to Russia.112  Immediately
following the Beltransgaz transaction, the company’s executives all re-
ceived a threefold bump in salary and a new car.113
Considering that the four newly-sanctioned companies do not
trade much with the United States, American sanctions will not im-
poverish them.114 If the EU balks at conducting business with them,
however, then losses may make these enterprises more susceptible to
103 Ekaterina Shokhina, A New Eurasian Union is Born, EXPERT MAGAZINE
(Nov. 29, 2011), available in English at http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/11/29/
a_new_eurasian_union_is_born_13838.html; Soldatkin & Pinchuk, supra note 87.
104 Shokhina, supra note 103.
105 Id.
106 See Soldatkin & Pinchuk, supra note 88.
107 Surikov: Belarusians Drag Feet MAZ and KamAZ Merger, TELEGRAF.BY (Jan.
5, 2012), http://telegraf.by/en/2012/01/surikov-belorusi-tormozyat-sliyanie-maza-i-
kamaza.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See The Russian Expansion, supra note 78.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 United States Sanctions “Harmless” for Belneftekhim, BELARUSIAN TELEGRAPH
AGENCY (Aug. 12, 2011), http://news.belta.by/en/news/econom?id=649636. Total
trade with the United States accounts for only 0.3 percent of Belarusian exports.
EC STATISTICS – BELARUS, supra note 23.
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Russian appropriation.115 While Russian ownership brings with it cer-
tain efficiencies, perks, and short-term infusions of cash, long run rev-
enues will still flow out of Belarus. Thus, if the United States cares
about the wellbeing of Belarusian citizens,116 these sanctions will
counter American interests. When Belarus reforms, its people will
have been deprived of their most effective moneymaking businesses.
Realistically, Lukashenko will remain in power only as long as
Russia wants him in that role.117 At the moment, he happens to be
indispensable to Russian interests.118 If Washington wishes to change
the state of affairs in Belarus, it should try to find incentives for Mos-
cow to elicit regime change. Russia’s gains are not limited to economic
advantages. Russia has two military bases in Belarus, for which it
pays no rent.119 In contrast, Ukraine charges Russia $40 billion over
thirty years for one naval base on the Black Sea.120 Politically, Moscow
can also rely on Lukashenko as a mouthpiece against the West. While
the Kremlin has to tread carefully in its diplomatic relations with the
United States and the EU, Lukashenko has thrown plenty of deroga-
tory comments their way.121 Unless Russia finds an alternative that
suits its interests at least as well, it will continue supporting
Lukashenko.
PART V: CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE
In the last few years, a new superpower has gained an interest
in Belarus. China has exhibited a tendency to swoop into nations with
115 Cf. Belshina Export to Non-CIS up 2.2 Times in H1, BELARUSIAN TELEGRAPH
AGENCY (Aug. 5, 2011), http://news.belta.by/en/news/econom?id=648280 (indicat-
ing that one of the sanctioned companies had experienced a significant increase in
exports to Europe just before the United States sanctions were instituted).
116 See Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act, supra note 18, at § 3(2)-(5).
117 See Putin’s Unprecedented Generosity, supra note 80.
118 See S.B., Lukashenka in Moscow: The Prodigal Son Is Coming Back?, BELARUS
DIGEST (Dec. 1, 2011), http://belarusdigest.com/story/lukashenka-moscow-prodigal
-son-coming-back-6742 [hereinafter Lukashenka in Moscow].
119 Lukashenko Reminds of Russia’s Free Rent of Two Military Bases in Belarus,
BELARUSIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY (Apr. 25, 2010), http://news.belta.by/en/news/
president?id=522386.
120 Philippe Conde & Vasco Martins, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol Be-
yond 2017, DIPLOWEB.COM (May 23, 2010), http://www.diploweb.com/Russia-s-
Black-Sea-fleet-in.html.
121 E.g., Belarus President Lukashenko Calls George W Bush World’s Main Terror-
ist, MOSNEWS.COM (Mar. 19, 2006), http://www.nogw.com/download/2006_lukash
bush_terrorist.pdf.
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totalitarian governments.122 While Western powers criticize dictators
and limit economic interaction with authoritarian regimes, the Chi-
nese have willingly filled the vacuums left by United States with-
drawal.123 Similar to Moscow, Beijing has extended low interest loans
in exchange for stakes in Belarusian state enterprises.124 For example,
in October 2011, Belarus received a $1 billion loan at three percent
interest, for which China will get preference in the purchase of Belaru-
sian chemistry assets.125 The Chinese have announced a plan to dras-
tically increase foreign direct investment in Belarus.126 Beijing does
not fear the risks associated with an economically unstable partner,
mainly because Chinese state-owned investors do not face as much
pressure to make quick profits.127 Moreover, Belarus has experienced
underinvestment in manufacturing and infrastructure – two strengths
for the Chinese.128 With other countries feeling comfortable investing
only in trade and services, China has the opportunity to corner the
capital formation market.129
Beijing’s actions clearly support the idea that it takes its rela-
tionship with Belarus seriously. Over the past two years, Chinese
banks have invested $15 billion in Belarus.130 At least five of the Chi-
nese companies currently in Belarus are publicly listed and have a
market cap of over $500 million.131 The two governments have already
agreed to create a Chinese industrial park with a massive hotel serv-
ing Chinese businessmen.132 More telling, Lukashenko has expressed
a desire to develop a Chinatown in Minsk.133 The two nations’ budding
cooperation extends beyond the business sector. The Chinese are
building a satellite for Belarus, the first time they have done so for any
122 See Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: United
States Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 354
(2011).
123 Id.
124 Iacob Koch-Weser, China Helps an Ailing Autocracy, BELARUS DIGEST (Nov.
10, 2011), http://www.belarusdigest.com/story/china-helps-ailing-autocracy-6495
[hereinafter China Helps an Ailing Autocracy]; Cash-flooded China to Loan $1Bln
to Cash-hungry Belarus, RT (Sept. 20, 2011), http://rt.com/news/china-loan-
belarus-deal-929/.
125 Cash-flooded China to Loan $1Bln to Cash-hungry Belarus, supra note 124.
126 Iacob Koch-Weser, Chinese FDI in Belarus: Investing in a Backwater?, BE-
LARUS DIGEST (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.belarusdigest.com/story/chinese-fdi-
belarus-investing-backwater-6359 [hereinafter Chinese FDI in Belarus].
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 Cash-flooded China to Loan $1Bln to Cash-hungry Belarus, supra note 124.
131 China Helps an Ailing Autocracy, supra note 124.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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European nation.134 In addition, they have exported nuclear and ther-
mal energy projects, as well as chemical production.135
As China continues to entrench itself within its European ally,
tensions between China and Russia may arise.136 Based purely on eco-
nomic importance, Russia should win over China in Belarus. Russia
accounts for about half of Belarus’s foreign trade, while China com-
prises less than five percent.137 For the most part, however, these two
international superpowers seem to focus on noncompeting indus-
tries.138 Russia is focused on Belarus’s oil and gas reserves, while
China focuses on Belarus’s infrastructure and machinery.139 Russia
and China compete, however, over Belarus’s power generation and
chemical industries.140
Even with this potential for friction, they can split the Belaru-
sian pie easily. Considering that Belarus is set to privatize 180 state-
owned ventures, Russia and China are in a prime position to carve up
Belarus between them.141 In 2012 alone, the Belarusian government
has decided to sell $2.5 billion of state property.142 With this trend, it
is conceivable that even if Lukashenko is ousted, there may be limited
room for Western influence.
PART VI: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE EURASIAN UNION
Eurasian integration offers substantive aspects that counteract
American interests and defeat economic sanctions. Still, the creation of
a Eurasian common market will likely offer the United States certain
opportunities, some of which it can use to deal with Belarus. If it acts
quickly, the United States can rely on integration among the former
Soviet republics to help it secure a foothold in the growing market.
Even without United States involvement, however, the EEU’s stated
goal of having all member nations join the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) will help liberalize the Belarusian economic system.143
134 Xin Dingding, China to Build Satellite for Belarus, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 20,
2011), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-09/20/content_13737721.htm.
135 China Helps an Ailing Autocracy, supra note 124.
136 Lenders of Last Resort, supra note 83.
137 EC STATISTICS – BELARUS, supra note 23, at 6.
138 Lenders of Last Resort, supra note 83.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Belarus Government Plans to Sell State Property for $2.5 Billion in 2012,
TELEGRAF.BY (Jan. 3, 2012), http://telegraf.by/en/2012/01/v-2012-godu-v-belarusi-
planiruyut-prodat-gossobstvennosti-na-2-5-mlrd-dollarov.
143 See Declaration on the Eurasian Economic Integration, ADVISORY AND EXPERT
COUNCIL OF THE CUSTOMS UNION (Nov. 18, 2011), available  at http://www.sovet-
31478_rgl_11-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A      06/15/2012   17:09:41
31478_rgl_11-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A      06/15/2012   17:09:41
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\11-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 17 15-JUN-12 16:04
2012] OPPORTUNISTIC DISCIPLINE 307
As China’s involvement illustrates, Belarus can offer solid in-
vestment opportunities.144 Unhindered access to the massive Russian
market is one of the main incentives for Russia’s neighbors to join the
EEU framework.145 The vast majority of Russia’s population resides in
the European portion of the country, which places Central Asian EEU
members at a disadvantage.146 On the other hand, Belarus, which is
the only other European member of the EEU framework, can offer
cheap labor and proximity to the target EEU market.147 Belarus ranks
considerably higher than Russia on the Doing Business Index,148 mak-
ing it a surprisingly solid option for American businesses searching for
investment opportunities. Similarly, the United States may benefit
significantly by emulating Russia and China in providing low interest
loans in exchange for stakes in Belarusian state-owned enterprises.
Though Belarus’s recent economic troubles have caused rating agen-
cies to lower the ratings of Belarusian debt,149 it still remains an in-
triguing opportunity. Admittedly, such a scheme would require the
United States to overhaul its sanction structure entirely. Current
United States sanctions discourage foreign aid to the Belarusian gov-
ernment.150 Moreover, with the OFAC’s freezing of Belarusian assets,
Lukashenko probably would respond in kind if given the opportu-
nity.151 Nonetheless, if the United States decides to deviate from the
erroneous approach of sanctioning Belarusian enterprises, it could see
a significant windfall. If the United States hesitates, however, it may
lose its chance.
The United States can invest in other EEU members and also
benefit from Eurasian integration. Of the five nations currently con-
ts.ru/poleznie_materiali/normativno_pravovie_dokumenti/deklaraciya_o_evraziys
koy_ekonomicheskoy_integracii/.
144 China Helps an Ailing Autocracy, supra note 124.
145 See The World Factbook – Belarus, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/bo.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2011).
146 See Anatoly Vishnevsky, Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution for Russia?,
6, U.N. Doc. UN/POP/PRA/2000/14 (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.un.
org/esa/population/publications/popdecline/vishnevsky.pdf.
147 Sergei Blagov, International Trade Customs Union of Kazakhstan, Russia, Be-
larus Approves Kyrgyzstan’s Membership, Int’l Trade Rep. Online (BNA) No. 28, at
A-18 (Oct. 20, 2011).
148 See Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK (June 2011), http://www.doingbusiness.
org/rankings.
149 Preiherman, supra note 81.
150 See, e.g., Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 108-347, 118 Stat.
1383 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 5811 (2012)).
151 For now, the only retaliatory sanction that Belarus has instituted is the sus-
pension of a uranium exchange program. No Future for US-Belarus Relations, RT
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://rt.com/politics/belarus-democracy-gordon-opposition-683/.
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sidered in the EEU framework,152 Kazakhstan has the most favorable
business environment.153 The Central Asian republic stands to benefit
significantly from Eurasian integration, and the United States can use
it as a gateway into the EEU. Unlike Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, Ka-
zakhstan does not depend on Russian markets to survive.154 Goods
sold to Russia account for less than a tenth of the Kazakhs’ exports,155
but this is anticipated to increase quickly.156
Since the EurAsEC customs union (“Customs Union”) began
operating in 2010, Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia have increased by
almost 40 percent, and its exports to Belarus have more than
doubled.157 Moreover, due to its geography, Kazakhstan depends on
the ability to transport goods through other countries to Western mar-
kets.158 The Customs Union has allowed Kazakhstan to lower these
shipping costs.159
Though its financial sector still has problems, Kazakhstan’s
fiscal future seems positive.160 The restructuring of three banks has
reduced foreign indebtedness and the insurance sector has im-
proved.161 Also, in an effort to upgrade the domestic securities market,
the government has created proactive plans, which include increased
collaboration with international organizations.162 Both Fitch Ratings
and Standard & Poor’s have raised the country’s foreign currency debt
152 Currently, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to form the EEU by
2015. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have both indicated that they are interested in
joining. Blagov, supra note 147, at A-18.
153 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus Promise Eurasian Union Not to Become New
USSR, GAZETA.KZ (Nov. 22, 2011), http://engarticles.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=35
2668.
154 See World Factbook – Kazakhstan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html (last updated Feb. 23, 2012); see also World
Factbook – Belarus, supra note 145; World Factbook – Kyrgyzstan, CIA, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html (last updated
Feb. 23, 2012).
155 World Factbook – Kazakhstan, supra note 154.
156 See Plaschinsky, supra note 79.
157 Id. EurAsEC is the Eurasian Economic Community, which initially set in mo-
tion the creation of a customs union and a common market among former Soviet
republics. See also, EURASEC TODAY, supra note 19, at 35.
158 WTO Accession, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, http://www.
kazakhembus.com/index.php?page=wto-accession (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
159 Id.
160 Scott Rose, Kazakhstan Upgraded at Fitch to Tie Russia on Foreign Assets,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/kazakh
stan-upgraded-at-fitch-to-tie-russia-on-foreign-assets-1-.html#.
161 Financial Sector, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, http://www.
kazakhembus.com/index.php?page=banking-system (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
162 See id.
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rating most likely because of these developments.163 Until now, the
main source of economic trouble in Kazakhstan has been the lack of
quality investors.164 The United States has the ability to fill that void.
If it does not, then another country will likely take advantage of Ka-
zakhstan’s favorable legal infrastructure and economic opportunities.
Even if the United States decides not to invest in the EEU or to
extend loans to Belarus, Eurasian integration may elicit some positive
changes. The EEU strives to have all of its members become a part of
the WTO in the near future.165 In 2010, Belarus’s government stated
that it wished to intensify WTO accession efforts in 2012.166 During
the economic crisis of 2011, however, the legislature limited exports of
gasoline, food, and other essential consumer products to countries
outside the Customs Union.167 This was a step in the wrong direction,
but with Russia getting the green light to enter the WTO, Belarus will
not be far behind.168 To do that, the government will need to liberalize
the country’s economic policies.169 For example, Belarus will have to
relax currency control regulations.170 Prior to the integration efforts,
all enterprises conducting business in Belarus had to sell foreign cur-
rency to the state.171 Now, however, as a requirement for entering the
SES, the government will have to abolish this law.172 Further eco-
nomic liberalization will naturally continue due to Russia’s gui-
dance.173 These byproducts of Eurasian integration will inherently
benefit American interests.
PART VII: READJUSTING TRAVEL LAWS
Since 2006, both the United States and the EU have intermit-
tently placed Lukashenko and members of his government on travel
163 Rose, supra note 160.
164 Financial Sector, supra note 161.
165 Presidents of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan Sign Eurasian Economic Inte-
gration Declaration, BELTA (Nov. 11, 2011), http://news.belta.by/en/main_news?
id=667406.
166 Sergei Blagov, WTO: Kazakh Minister Says Nation Will Finalize WTO Acces-
sion Negotiations by End of 2012, Int’l Trade Rep. Online (BNA) No. 28, at 1078
(June 30, 2011).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See Sergei Blagov, WTO: Russian President Vows Domestic Industry Will Not
Be Hobbled by WTO Commitments, Int’l Trade Rep. Online (BNA) No. 28, at 1973
(Dec. 8, 2011).
170 Id.
171 See Plaschinsky, supra note 79.
172 Id.
173 See Blagov, WTO: Russian President Vows Domestic Industry Will Not Be Hob-
bled by WTO Commitments, supra note 169.
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blacklists.174 Soon after the United States issued its newest round of
sanctions in early 2012, the EU followed suit by blacklisting 135 Be-
larusian officials.175 Probably more so than any other sanction, travel
bans are much more applicable through the EU than the United States
While travel bans do succeed in punishing only those whom the West
wishes to discipline, they are not necessarily effective in forcing the
desired results.176 Although the current travel ban structure is not
detrimental to Western interests, its breadth should be reconsid-
ered.177 As a corollary, Western powers should also change their visa
laws.178
While the United States and the EU desire changes in the Be-
larusian government, the volume of banned Belarusian officials is ex-
cessive.179 Not all Belarusian politicians sympathize with
Lukashenko’s policies, particularly in the realm of economics.180 From
a more symbolic standpoint, in stark contrast to the norm, certain offi-
cials even deliver all their public speeches in Belarusian.181 Interest-
ingly, whereas in past years a disgruntled politician would have to
leave the ruling party in order to oppose mainstream policies, it has
become possible for Belarusian politicians  to dissent while remaining
a member of the government.182
This indicates that perhaps the West’s best chance of ousting
Lukashenko involves allowing current members of the Belarusian gov-
ernment to liberalize the regime from the inside. Of course, this is no
easy task. The United States and the EU cannot expressly support
particular Belarusian politicians, as that would likely doom the politi-
cians’ careers. A decision not to ban particular officials, however, may
implicitly support politicians who might not share the current govern-
ment’s views. Instead of categorically blacklisting all prominent Be-
174 WOEHREL, supra note 28, at 2.
175 EU Closes Its Border for 135 More Belarusian Officials, TELEGRAF.BY (Jan.
13, 2012), http://telegraf.by/en/2012/01/es-zakroet-svoyu-granicu-esche-dlya-135-
belorusskih-chinovnikov.
176 See, e.g., Mathew Charles, The EU and Belarus: Sanctions? What Sanctions?,
EU OBSERVER, Jan. 27, 2012, http://euobserver.com/7/115040 (describing the inef-
fectiveness of the travel ban, as a blacklisted Belarusian official was able to go to a
conference in France).
177 See Getting the Travel Ban Right, supra note 20.
178 See Shushkevich, supra note 20.
179 See Getting the Travel Ban Right, supra note 20.
180 See S.B., supra note 22.
181 See Y.K., Who Rules Belarus?, BELARUS DIGEST (Nov. 21, 2011), http://belarus
digest.com/story/who-rules-belarus-6597 [hereinafter Who Rules Belarus?].
182 S.B., supra note 22.
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larusian officials, the West should first conduct a thorough analysis of
those individuals it considers sanctioning.183
If the West wishes to make a meaningful change that would
help ordinary Belarusian citizens without helping the government, it
should revise its visa regimes in regard to Belarus.184 Free visas for
non-blacklisted individuals would go a long way. Currently, visas to
the European Union range from C= 60 to C= 99 – a huge portion of the
average monthly income in Belarus.185 Belarusians also have to deal
with more red tape in obtaining an EU visa than the citizens of any
other European nation.186 In a country where freedom of the press is
virtually nonexistent, travel restrictions can exacerbate the lack of
Western thought.
Free visas should not cost the West much, but they would facil-
itate more exchange and cooperation projects.187 Such a policy would
also make it easier for Belarusians to obtain Western educations,
which is arguably one of the most effective ways to infuse Western
ideals into a country.188 Also, outside of their homeland, Belarusians
prefer Europe for travel and work.189 Currently, Poland is the only EU
country where well-educated Belarusians can work without restric-
tions.190 Though the EU has every right to be concerned with security
and illegal immigration, Belarusians have not exhibited any threaten-
ing signs in those areas.191 With the country’s entire population less
than 10 million, Belarusians are unlikely to create an unmanageable
influx of people.192  Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between
free visas and uncontrolled travel. The West would still have the capa-
bility of screening the people to whom it issues visas. In comparison to
183 Getting the Travel Ban Right, supra note 20.
184 Shushkevich, supra note 20.
185 Schengen Visa Fees, SHENGEN VISA FEES, http://www.euro-dollar-currency.
com/schengen_visa_fees.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (showing costs of
Schengen visas); Average Monthly Income in Belarus – 145$, BELSAT (Nov. 17,
2011), http://belsat.eu/en/wiadomosci/a,5836,average-monthly-income-in-belarus-
145.html (listing the average monthly income of Belarusians at the end of 2011).
At the time of this Comment’s writing, C= 1 equaled about $1.27.
186 George Plaschinsky, Belarus Is the World’s Schengen Visa Champion, BELARUS
DIGEST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-worlds-schengen-
visa-champion-7541. It is worth noting that Europeans also struggle with the visa
process when they wish to visit Belarus. Lack of reciprocity, however, should not
have any effect on the EU’s choice of visa regime. These are unilateral sanctions,
after all. Id.
187 S.B., supra note 22.
188 Shushkevich, supra note 20.
189 Lukashenka in Moscow, supra note 118.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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the more costly economic sanctions, free visas for the marginal number
of individuals who may wish to travel to Europe is an insignificant
expense. Most importantly, this policy would help the West forge
closer ties with Belarus’s people as opposed to its government.
PART VIII: CONCLUSION
Though international law validates economic and political
sanctions, such sanctions are detrimental to Western interests. As-
suming that the West actually wishes to improve the plight of Belaru-
sian citizens, sanctioning Belarusian enterprises is not the best means
to accomplish this goal. While the Belarusian government cannot re-
spond in a fashion that would be detrimental to the United States, the
political and economic forces at play in this Eastern European nation
should concern Washington. Although it is no surprise that Russia
continues to build its influence within Belarus, China’s recent entry
should also concern the United States. These two Eastern superpowers
will continue appropriating Belarusian assets. While Belarus will ac-
quire short-term relief from its economic woes, it will sell out its fu-
ture. At the same time, American enterprise should actively consider
entering the EEU market; if not in Belarus then in Kazakhstan, which
provides an excellent climate for foreign investment. EEU members
will have to compete among each other to draw foreign investment,
and the United States should take advantage of these opportunities.
The West also should reconsider its travel bans and visa re-
gimes. Though blacklists succeed in punishing the government rather
than the populace, they still fail to help ordinary Belarusians. Younger
politicians espouse more liberal ideologies,193 and while they are still
part of the Lukashenko machine, they might be the most effective
source of change. Travel bans, instead, only serve to alienate them.
Likewise, high costs of visas prevent many Belarusians from visiting,
working, and studying in Western countries. Eliminating these
debilitating costs should not pose economic or security threats to the
West, while it would expose Belarusians to the Western methodologies
of thinking and living.
Regardless of the West’s policies, change in Belarus will not
occur overnight. A new generation of Belarusians may need to come to
power before any real change occurs. Right now, Belarus is mostly a
gerontocracy, similar to the Soviet Union in its later years.194 In addi-
tion, most of Lukashenko’s support comes from older citizens.195 Quite
simply, many of these people will die soon, and with them much of
193 Who Rules Belarus?, supra note 181.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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Lukashenko’s support. When that finally occurs, the West should ben-
efit from having politicians and voters who have not been isolated and
alienated as before.
